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TAXATION OF SAME-SEX COUPLES AFTER 
UNITED STATES V. WINDSOR: DID THE IRS 
GET IT RIGHT IN REVENUE RULING 2013-17? 
PATRICIA A. CAIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The tax world for same-sex couples changed dramatically on June 
26, 2013, when the United States Supreme Court handed down its de-
cision in United States v. Windsor. 1 The Court ruled that Section 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional.2 That case in-
volved Edie Windsor's claim for a tax refund, based on the fact that the 
IRS had failed to recognize her marriage to her deceased spouse.3 
Windsor argued that the estate, which was left to her, was entitled to a 
marital deduction. The amount of wrongly paid taxes was $363,000.4 
As Windsor tells it, "I was anguished about the money, but it was more 
about the indignation. The government was not recognizing us, and 
we deserved recognition."5 
Edie and her spouse, Thea Spyer, had been together over 40 
years.6 When Spyer's health deteriorated due to multiple sclerosis, the 
*Professor of Law, Santa Clara University and Aliber Family Chair in Law, Emerita, 
University of Iowa. 
I 570 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
2 Id. (Section 3 of DOMA provides, "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of 
Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." I U.S.C. § 7 
(2012) ). 
3 Id. at 2683. 
4 fd. 
5 Lila Shapiro, Edie Windsor vs. DOMA May Be Best Chance to Strike Federal Gay Marriage 
Ban, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2012, 3:43 PM), http:/ /www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/07/17 /edie-windsor-doma_n_l680217.html. 
G See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (noting that Windsor and Spyer met in 1963 and 
remained together until Spyer's death in 2009). 
(269) 
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couple decided they wanted to tie the knot legally before it was too 
late.7 They wed in Toronto in 2007.8 Two years later Spyer died and 
the estate tax problem arose.9 Windsor filed her refund suit in 2010. 10 
Throughout the litigation, much emphasis was placed on the fact 
that New York recognized Canadian marriages in 2009, even though a 
same-sex couple could not legally marry in New York at that time. 11 
New York did not recognize marriages between couples of the same 
sex for state taxation purposes, however. 12 For example, a same-sex 
married couple could not file a joint tax return at the state level. State 
revenue officials determined that it would be too difficult to adminis-
ter joint returns at the state level when the couple could not, because 
of DOMA, file jointly at the federal level. 13 While the official an-
nouncement from the Department of Revenue referred only to in-
come taxes, it was assumed by practitioners that the nonrecognition 
rule also applied to estate taxes. 14 The State of New York had a lower 
exemption level than the federal one, but otherwise its estate tax is 
7 See id. (noting concern about Spyer's deteriorating health as an impetus behind 
Windsor and Spyer's decision to wed); see also Shapiro, supra note 5 (discussing Spyer's 
years-long battle with multiple sclerosis). 
s Shapiro, supra note 5. 
9 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. The estate tax exemption in 2009 was only $3.5 million, 
compared to $5.25 million in 2013. BRANT]. HELLWIG & ROHERT T. DANFORTH, ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 18 (2d ed. 2013). If Spyer had died after 2009, there would have 
been no estate tax due because of the higher exemption (and the fact that the estate 
tax totally went away in 2010, but just for that year). See id. 
10 Shapiro, supra note 5. 
11 Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y.), affd 699 F.3d 169 
(2d Cir. 2012), affd 570 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Windsor v. United States, 699 
F.3d 169, 177-78 (2d Cr. 2102), affd 570 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
12 Patricia A. Cain, The New York Marriage Equality Act and the Income Tax, 5 ALn. Gov'T 
L. REV. 634, 638 (2012). 
13 See N.Y. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. Technical Mem. TSB-A-06(2)1 (Apr. 4, 
2006), available at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/advisory_opinions/income/a06_2i.pdf 
[hereinafter N.Y. TSBA-06(2)1]. 
14 See, e.g., Sean R. Weissbart, Strategies to Minimize Estate and Gift Tax for Same-Sex 
Couples, EST. PLAN. 33, 38 (Feb. 2010) (noting, in a section devoted to state estate and 
gift tax considerations for same-sex couples, that "although New York currently recog-
nizes same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions, according to an advisory 
opinion from 2006, New York treats same-sex couples as unmarried individuals for tax 
purposes." (citing N.Y. TSBA-06(2)1, supra note 13)). 
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based on the federal estate tax provisions. 15 Windsor also paid an es-
tate tax to New York that she should not have had to pay. 16 
Despite this nonrecognition of the Windsor and Spyer marriage 
for state taxation purposes, it did seem to matter to both the federal 
district court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that New 
York, the state of domicile of the couple, did in fact recognize the mar-
riage generally. At the Supreme Court level, New York's recognition of 
the marriage appeared important as well. Justice Kennedy mentioned 
it several times in his majority opinion. 17 Furthermore, the federalism 
concerns that were raised in the case depended on there being a con-
flict between state and federal law, and of course, there would be none 
if New York had refused to recognize the Windsor-Spyer marriage as 
well. While the case was decided primarily on equal protection 
grounds, some constitutional scholars believe that concerns about fed-
eralism helped Kennedy to scrutinize the provision more closely than 
mere traditional rational basis analysis would have required. 18 
Once the opinion was handed down, pundits across the country 
began to wonder about the questions that Windsor did not answer: 
(1) What marriages would the federal government recognize? Would 
Windsor be limited to marriages in states where the marriage was rec-
ognized (a place of domicile test)? Or, would the federal govern-
ment apply a place of celebration test to determine the validity of a 
marriage? 
(2) What should be the retroactive effect of Windsori' Once the Court 
struck DOMA down as unconstitutional, that meant it had been un-
constitutional all along. But what if taxpayers and employers had re-
15 See N.Y. TAX LAw § 951 (McKinney 2006) (describing the interplay between the 
federal Internal Revenue Code and determination of New York state estate tax and 
establishing an exclusion amount of $1,000,000 for state estate tax purposes); see also 
H~:LLWIG & DANFORTH, supra note 9, at 18 (indicating the federal exclusion amount in 
2009 was $3,500,000). 
16 She did, however, file a protective claim for a refund with the State of New York, 
and the tax paid was refunded to her after the Supreme Court decision was handed 
down. See Press Release, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces 
Estate Tax Refunds Available to Qualified Spouses of Same-Sex Couples Uuly 23, 2013), 
availabl,e at https:/ /www.governor.ny.gov/press/07232013-estate-tax-returns. 
17 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689, 2692 (2013). 
18 See Ilya Somin, The Impact of Judicial Review on American Federalism: Promoting Central-
ization More Than State Autonomy, in COURTS IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES: FEDERALISTS OR 
UNITARISTs? (Nicholas Aroney & John Kincaid eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 35-
36), availabl,e at http:/ /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311400; see also 
Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor, Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 Co I.UM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 
156, 164 (2013) (noting the debate among scholars as to whether federalism played a 
part in the decision). 
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lied on DOMA and taken tax reporting positions accordingly? Could 
those positions now be challenged? 
(3) What about Registered Domestic Partners (RDPs) and Civil Union 
Partners (CUPs)? Since they are accorded all the rights and benefits 
of marriage under the laws of some states, would they be treated as 
spouses for federal purposes? 
Some federal agencies responded quickly. The Office of Person-
nel Management (OPM) responded that so long as the marriage was 
contracted in a recognition state, 19 the federal agency would consider 
the marriage valid for purposes of extending benefits to federal em-
ployees. 20 The employee's state of domicile at the time of the mar-
riage, or at any other time, would be irrelevant. The agency further 
announced that RDPs and CUPs would not be treated as spouses.21 
The Department of Defense followed and adopted the same two rules: 
place of celebration for validity of the marriage, and RDPs and CUPs 
would not be treated as spouses.22 
Finally, on August 29, 2013, the long-awaited guidance from the 
Internal Revenue Service was issued.23 In Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the 
IRS ruled that it would follow the place of celebration rule and that 
taxpayers who had relied on DOMA with respect to filing status would 
essentially be held harmless, but taxpayers who would benefit from fil-
ing amended returns as married taxpayers were free to do so, provided 
the past tax year was still open under the applicable statute of limita-
tions.24 And, consistent with policies announced by other federal agen-
cies, the ruling concluded that RDPs and CUPs would not be treated as 
spouses.25 
The ruling stated that the new rule would become fully effective 
on September 16, 2013.26 That meant that any married taxpayers who 
had not yet filed their returns for tax year 2012 could opt to file as 
single provided they filed before September 16. As of September 16, 
19 By "recognition state" I mean only those states that recognize the validity of a mar-
riage between same-sex couples. Office of Personnel Benefits Administration Letter No. 
13-203 from John O'Brien Uuly 17, 2013), availab/,e at www.opm.gov. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (Aug. 13, 2013), available at 
www.defense.gov. 
23 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 l.R.B. 201. 
24 Id.; see I.R.C. § 65ll (2008) (establishing the statute of limitations). 
25 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 l.R.B. 201. 
26 Id. 
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all legally married same-sex spouses would have to file their original 
returns as married, either jointly or married filing separately.27 
Was the IRS right to adopt a place of celebration rule, or is there 
something about taxation that makes it more appropriate to adopt a 
place of domicile rule? And was it right to be so generous on the retro-
active effect of the new rule? Finally, does it make sense in the world 
of taxation to treat RDPs and CUPs as non-spouses, indeed as legal 
strangers, for purposes of taxation? The rest of this article will address 
these questions. 
II. ADOPTION OF THE PLACE OF CELEBRATION RULE 
The Internal Revenue Code does not indicate whether tax law 
should apply a place of celebration or place of domicile rule; nor is 
there anything in the treasury regulations that addresses this issue. 
The only definition of marriage in the Code is found in Section 7703, 
which provides that if you marry by the end of the year, you will be 
treated as married for the full year for certain tax purposes, such as 
filing status. 28 
Gay rights advocates generally supported a place of celebration 
rule, in keeping with the Respect for Marriage Act, which would have 
repealed DOMA.29 As introduced most recently on June 26, 2013,30 the 
27 The mling does not say that the September 16 date applies only to original returns. 
As drafted it did seem to apply to any return filed by a taxpayer after September 15, 
including amended returns. Tax return preparers became concerned about the possi-
bility that a client might want to file an amended return to correct an omission on the 
original return that had nothing to do with marital status. For example, assume tax-
payer A omitted a large charitable deduction in tax year 2011 and would now like to file 
an amended return. A does not want to file a joint return or a married filing separately 
return, but instead wants to retain her single filing status. Since the return is filed after 
September 15, is A still able to elect to file the amended return as single? The Septem-
ber 16 date applies only to original returns. See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for 
Individuals of the Same Sex Who Are Married Under State Law, IRS.cov (Nov. 20, 2013), 
http:/ /www.irs.gov/uac/ Answers-to-Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-Same-Sex-Married-
Couples ("For tax year 2012 and all prior years, same-sex spouses who file an original 
tax return on or after Sept. 16, 2013 (the effective date of Rev. Rul. 2013-17), generally 
must file using a married filing separately or jointly filing status."). 
2s 1.R.C. § 7703 (2004). 
29 S. 1236, 112th Cong. § 7 (2011); H.R. 2523, 112th Cong. § 7 (2011). 
30 H.R. 2523 was introduced by Representative Jerrold Nadler. It had 171 co-sponsors 
as of December 16, 2013. The Senate Bill is S. 1236, introduced by Senator Diane Fein-
stein. It had forty-two co-sponsors as of December 16, 2013. See http:/ /beta.congress. 
gov/bill/ l 13th/house-bill/2523 for updates. 
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Act proposes replacing current Section 3 of DOMA31 with the 
following: 
Sec. 7. Marriage (a) For the purposes of any Federal law in which marital 
status is a factor, an individual shall be considered married if that individ-
ual's marriage is valid in the State where the marriage was entered into 
or, in the case of a marriage entered into outside any State, if the mar-
riage is valid in the place where entered into and the marriage could have 
been entered into in a State. 
Many pundits, however, surmised that the IRS would not adopt a 
place of celebration standard because it had long relied on a state of 
domicile rule.32 Even the Human Rights Campaign, a strong supporter 
of the Respect for Marriage Act, announced that the general IRS rule 
in the past indicated a state of domicile rule.33 Now that the IRS has 
clearly stated in its August ruling that it will apply a place of celebra-
tion rule, many folks are scratching their heads and asking why the IRS 
changed course. Was it subject to political pressure to follow the other 
agencies and make the benefits of marriage as widely available as possi-
ble to same-sex married couples?34 Or is the rule justified as a matter 
of good tax policy? And, if it is good tax policy, then why hasn't place 
of celebration always been the rule? 
A. Past IRS Positions on Validity of Marriages 
The case that pundits typically cite as establishing the precedent 
that the Internal Revenue Service must rely on state of domicile rather 
than state of celebration is Eccles v. Commissioner. 35 The issue in that 
31 1 u.s.c. § 7 (2012). 
32 See Jeremy W. Peters, Federal Court Speaks, but Couples Still Face State Legal Patchwork, 
N.Y. TIMES June 26, 2013, available at http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27 /us/polit-
ics/federal-court-speaks-but-couples-still-face-state-legal-patchwork.html ("Federal taxes, 
for example, are generally determined by where a couple live."); Amy S. Elliott, Practi-
tioners Discuss Expected IRS Guidance on Determining Marital Status After Windsor, TAX 
Non:s, Aug. 1, 2013, at 3. 
33 See Anne A. Marchessault, Federal Marriage Act Would Help Worker.s Who Have Same-Sex 
Spouses, Speaker Says, 133 DLR A-11,July 11, 2013 (quoting Brian Moulton, Legal Direc-
tor, Human Rights Campaign). 
34 Of course in tax law, having one's marriage recognized is not always beneficial. 
Sometimes a couple's tax burden increases when they marry. See generally Patricia A. 
Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 481, 483-84 (2009); 
Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
Rt:v. 1529, 1564-68 (2008). 
35 Comm'r v. Eccles, 19 T.C. 1049, affd 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953); see HRC 
whitepaper entitled "Re: Development of 'State of Domicile Standard in Federal Tax 
Policy'" (on file with author). 
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case was whether or not husband and wife were married at the end of 
the year for purposes of determining how they should have filed their 
tax return for that year.36 They were domiciled in Utah.37 They had 
married in Utah and they had filed for divorce in Utah.38 Before the 
end of the year in question, the divorce court had issued an interlocu-
tory decree that created a legal separation but not a divorce.39 Under 
Utah law, the divorce would not become final for another six months, 
a time period that extended into the following year.40 Taxpayer took 
the position that he was still legally married at the end of the year and 
thus entitled to file jointly with his wife. 41 The Commissioner, relying 
on the forerunner to Section 7703, pointed to the language in that 
statute that says, "an individual who is legally separated from his spouse 
under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance shall not be con-
sidered as married. "42 The issue, said the court, was whether or not, 
under Utah law, the decree was one of divorce or of separate mainte-
nance.43 After examining Utah law, the court concluded that the de-
cree was neither.44 
This case does not present an issue of a conflict between the laws 
of a recognition state and a nonrecogniton state. The only potential 
conflict here is a conflict between state law (Utah) and federal law (the 
Internal Revenue Code). And the court chose state law.45 But a more 
accurate way to describe this case is as one in which the courts con-
strued the language "legally separated" and "decree of ... separate 
maintenance" differently from the IRS.46 
3fi See Eccks, 19 T.C. 1049. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 1049, 1051. 
41 See id. at 1051. 
42 Id. at 1050-51; l.R.C. § 7703(a)(2) (formerly under 53 U.S.C. § 5l(a) (1939)). 
43 See Eccks, 19 T.C. at 1050. 
44 The court relied heavily on Utah family law, which provided that until the divorce 
was final, the spouses would be treated as spouses. That meant that if husband had died 
before the six-month period had expired, surviving wife would have been entitled to a 
spousal share of his estate. And, as the court concluded, that should mean the estate 
would be entitled to a marital deduction. If the spouse were going to be recognized as a 
spouse for purposes of the estate tax, uniformity would suggest she should continue to 
be recognized as such for purposes of the income tax. See id. at 1053-54. 
45 See id. 
4r. The Commissioner continued to take the position that any decree that created a 
legal separation meant that the spouses should no longer be treated as married. He 
issued a nonacquiescence in Eccles. Id. at 1052, 1054-55. See Rev. Rul. 55-178, 1955-1 C.B. 
322. But after losing this position consistently in the courts, the Commissioner finally 
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Eccles is cited in a number of subsequent cases for the principle 
that the court must focus on the state law in which the couple was 
domiciled to determine the validity of a marriage.47 But all of these 
cases involve either a question of whether the couple is validly divorced 
under the only state law that is relevant (as was the case in Eccles) or 
whether a divorce is valid when there is conflict between two states (or 
a state and a foreign country) as to the validity of the divorce. 
The presence of an invalid divorce can affect the validity of a mar-
riage entered into subsequent to the divorce, but that is the only sense 
in which the courts and the IRS have supported a choice of law rule 
that will look to the state of domicile.48 And, the domicile that matters 
here is domicile at the time of divorce.49 A typical example from these 
cases involves a couple married and living in New York. In situations 
where New York would not grant a divorce,50 one spouse (usually the 
husband) travels to a jurisdiction that will allow the divorce (Mexico, 
Florida, Nevada) and then returns to New York and marries a second 
wife. The first wife files a declaratory action in the New York courts 
asking that the court declare the invalidity of the foreign divorce and 
that she is still the only legal wife. The New York court does so. 51 Later, 
the husband dies in New York. The conflict here is between two states 
(e.g., New York and Florida). And, if New York law applies, then the 
divorce is invalid and that means that the second marriage is invalid as 
well. 
withdrew the nonacquiescence, revoked the 1955 ruling, and agreed to follow the judi-
cial constructions of the statute. See Rev. Ru!. 57-368, 1957-2 C.B. 896. 
47 See, e.g., Gersten v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 756, 770 (1957), affd in rekvant part, 267 F.2d 
195, 195-96, 200 (9th Cir. 1959) (citing Eccles as authority for relying on the state of 
domicile of the spouses to determine the validity of their marriage); Dunn v. Comm'r, 
70 T.C. 361, 366 (1978), affd 601 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging Eccles as a 
decision "recognizing that whether an individual is 'married' is, for purposes of the tax 
laws, to be determined by the law of the state of the marital domicile."). 
48 See Gersten, 28 T.C. at 770-71. 
49 Id. 
50 These cases stem from the fact that no-fault divorce was not widely available until 
the 1960s and in New York, was not available until 2010. See]. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth 
C. Stem, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559 
(2007);Joel Stashenko, Those Eager to be "Ex-Spouse" Embrace No-Fault, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 13, 
2010, at 1. 
51 Note that these cases typically involved unilateral divorce actions, i.e., where only 
one spouse submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. In 1965, the New York 
Court of Appeals did uphold a bilateral Mexican divorce, i.e., one in which both 
spouses submitted to the jurisdiction even though neither spouse had any other contact 
with the jurisdiction. See Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 713 (N.Y. 1965). 
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Often, the IRS has turned to New York law (state of domicile) to 
determine the validity of the divorce and thus indirectly the validity of 
the second marriage.52 But even here, the case law is not uniform. 
Some cases do rely on domicile at time of divorce,53 but others have 
been willing to say that if the divorce was legal when and where it was 
obtained, it should be recognized for purposes of federal tax law.54 
Sorting through the cases, the following rule seems to emerge: if the 
case involves the estate tax and if the decedent is domiciled in the state 
that does not recognize the divorce, then the IRS will rely on the state 
of domicile. This makes some sense because the estate is being admin-
istered under the laws of a state that continues to recognize the first 
marriage. As a result, the first spouse is the only legal spouse and 
might be entitled to a spousal share. That spousal share should qualify 
for the marital deduction. In the absence of a divorce, however, none 
of these cases is determinative on the issue of whether or not a mar-
riage recognized in the place of celebration, but not by the place of 
domicile, should be recognized by the federal tax authorities. 
B. Revenue Ruling 1958-6(/>5 
Revenue Ruling 1958-66 is more on point. This ruling was cited 
and discussed in Revenue Ruling 2013-17.56 It provides authority for 
the position taken in the 2013 ruling.57 The 1958 ruling concluded 
that the IRS would recognize any common law marriage that was le-
gally entered into even if the spouses then moved to a state that did 
not recognize the marriage.58 This conclusion obviously rejects the 
state of domicile rule. At its core, this ruling stands for the proposition 
that once legally married, you remain legally married for tax purposes 
even if you are domiciled in a state that does not recognize your 
marriage. 
r.2 See, e.g., Estate of Goldwater, 539 F.2d 878, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1976). 
r.:i Id. (New York domicile and Mexican divorce); Estate of Steffke, 538 F.2d 730 (7th 
Cir. 1976) (Wisconsin domicile and Mexican divorce). 
''
4 See Estate of Spalding v. Comm'r, 537 F.2d 666, 667-69 (2d Cir. 1976) (New York 
domicile and Nevada divorce; altogether six different states played a role in this case); 
Estate of Borax v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 666, 668 (2d Cir. 1965) (NewYork domicile and 
Mexican divorce); Wondsel v. Comm'r, 350 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1965) (New York 
domicile and Florida divorce). But see Rev.Rut. 67-442, 1967-2 C.B. 65 (in which the IRS 
announced that it would not follow Borax and Wondsel). 
''''Rev. Rut. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. 
06 2013-38 I.RB. 201. 
r.1 Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60. 
r.s Id. at 60-61. 
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The role of domicile in the validity of common law marriages 
raises conflict of laws issues that are very similar to the conflicts issues 
that arise in the case of same-sex marriages. Today, all states will recog-
nize a valid common law marriage from another state, at least in cases 
in which the couple was domiciled in the state in which they claim to 
have become married.59 The states are split, however, as to whether or 
not they will recognize a common law marriage of a couple domiciled 
in that state that travel to another state and enter into a common law 
marriage while temporarily residing in that other state. A number of 
states will recognize such marriages so long as they were contracted 
validly in the foreign state.60 In other states, such marriages will not be 
recognized in the state of domicile. 61 The 1958 ruling appears to 
adopt a rule that says the IRS will look to the state of celebration rather 
than state of domicile.62 That makes the current 2013 ruling regarding 
recognition of same-sex marriages consistent with long-time tradition 
of the IRS.63 
59 See, e.g., Jennifer Thomas, Common Law Marriage, 22]. AM. ACAo. MATRIMONIAL L. 
151, 152 (2009). 
oo See In re Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 414 N.E.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. 1980); see also 
In re Estate of Duval v. Nathalie Duval, 777 N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (S.D. 2010) (stating that 
South Dakota will recognize a valid common law marriage from another state even if 
the couple was domiciled in South Dakota at the time and citing cases from other states 
that apply a similar rule). 
61 See Smith v. Anderson, 821 So. 2d 323, 326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
62 There are numerous tax cases that say in order to determine whether or not a 
couple has a valid common law marriage, the IRS relies on the marital domicile. But all 
of these cases involve couples who at all relevant times lived in states that did not recog-
nize common law marriages and never cohabited in a state that did recognize common 
law marriages. As a result the marital domicile can only be the place where they lived 
together. Such cases do not raise the conflict of laws issue discussed in the text. See 
Amaro v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 914 (1970) (couple only cohabited in California 
and Nevada, neither of which recognizes common law marriage); see also von Tersch v. 
Comm'r, 47 T.C. 415, 419 (1967) (announcing rule that validity of marriage is deter-
mined on the basis of the law of the state where the couple "resides"). Residence is 
where the couple lives and is not necessarily their domicile. 
63 A Westlaw search in the tax cases database turned up over eighty cases that in-
cluded the term "common law marriage." Twelve of these cases (including Windsor) 
include a citation to Rev. Rul. 58-66. None of the cases presented the issue addressed in 
Rev. Rul. 2013-17, i.e., whether to rely on place of celebration or place of domicile to 
determine the validity of a marriage. The only conflicts raised in any of the cases in-
volved the validity of a foreign divorce in the state of domicile. The common law mar-
riage cases fell into two groups: (l) cases in which the taxpayer had only lived in states 
that recognized common law marriages and the issue in such cases was whether or not 
the requirements for a valid common law marriage had been met, and (2) cases in 
which the taxpayer had claimed to be in a common law marriage even though the 
couple had never lived or cohabited in a state that recognized common law marriages. 
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C. Tax Policy 
In addition to being consistent with past IRS practice, the IRS was 
justified in adopting a place of celebration rule for sound reasons of 
tax policy. 
1. Marital status for tax purposes should not change as the taxpayers 
cross state lines and establish a new domicile 
If a state of domicile rule were applied, couples could establish a 
new domicile in a nonrecognition state and effectively become di-
vorced for tax purposes. The marriage might not be recognized by the 
new state of domicile, but it would continue to be recognized by seven-
teen other states.64 And the spouses would continue to live as though 
they were married. Such a rule would allow creative same-sex couples 
to manipulate the tax rules to their advantage. While living in a non-
recognition state, they could engage in such tax advantageous transac-
tions as selling loss property from one spouse to the other and 
recognizing the loss. 65 In high-income years they could avoid the mar-
riage tax penalty that applies to married couples. If in a later year, one 
spouse leaves the workforce temporarily, for example, to have a child, 
then the couple could establish a new domicile in a recognition state 
and be entitled to file jointly and thereby reduce tax liability. 
It is against public policy to give taxpayers this much control over 
which rules should apply to them from year to year. Indeed, Mr. and 
Ms. Boyter, Maryland residents subject to a tax penalty under joint fil-
ing, tried to do something similar many years ago. 66 They flew to Haiti 
at the end of each tax year and obtained a divorce.67 This entitled them 
Therefore, it may be a stretch to say turning to place of celebration is a long time 
tradition of the IRS. However, the ruling states the place of celebration as the policy 
and the IRS has never taken a position inconsistent with that. 
64 As of the end of 2013 there were at least seventeen states (plus the District of 
Columbia) that clearly recognize marriages of same-sex couples. The recognition came 
about by court decision in six states (California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and New Mexico), by legislation in eight states (Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Min-
nesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont), and by popular vote 
in three states (Maine, Maryland, and Washington). 17 States with Legal Gay Marriage and 
33 States with Sarne-Sex Marriage Bans, PRoCoN.ORG, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/ 
view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
65 See Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. Rt:v. 1529 (2008) (explaining additional tax advantages that married same-sex 
couples could claim if their marriage is not recognized under the tax law). 
66Boyter v. Comm'r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1383 (4th Cir. 1981). 
01 Id. at 1384. 
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to file as single.68 Then, upon return to Maryland, they remarried.69 
By doing this each year, they were manipulating the tax system to their 
benefit. The IRS audited them and claimed that the divorces were 
"sham transactions" that should be ignored for tax purposes.70 The 
matter was litigated and the IRS won on this theory before the court of 
appeals.71 While the IRS might use the sham transaction doctrine 
against a same-sex couple that manipulated the tax laws by changing 
domicile, it would be a much harder argument to make in the case of a 
same-sex couple. 72 It would be much simpler to administer a law that 
provides that changes in domicile do not affect marital status. 
2. The place of celebration rule is simpler to apply 
Ease of administration is a strong policy consideration in the for-
mulation of a national tax law. Imagine the IRS having to apply a state 
of domicile law to determine, for each year, whether or not the couple 
that was clearly married in a recognition state was similarly domiciled 
in a recognition state. When the Windsor litigation began in 2010,73 
there were only six jurisdictions that clearly recognized marriages of 
same-sex couples.74 In addition to these six jurisdictions, New York was 
said to recognize same-sex marriages, but not for state tax purposes. 75 
In addition, the Attorney General of Rhode Island had opined that 
6s Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1384-85. 
7I Id. at 1388 (ruling that the divorces were invalid because Maryland would not rec-
ognize the foreign divorces, but the Court of Appeals thought that Maryland law was 
not clear on that issue. Instead, it ruled, in a 2-to-1 decision, that even if the divorces 
were valid under the applicable law, they should be treated as shams for tax purposes). 
12 A divorce followed by a marriage a week later seems to have less substance that an 
actual change in location and the establishment of new meaningful connections with 
the new state. 
73 Shapiro, supra note 5 ("Windsor first filed suit in 2010 .... "). 
14 Those states were: Massachusetts (see Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 789 
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (marriages were authorized to begin in May 2004)); Connecti-
cut (see Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)); Iowa 
(Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009)); New Hampshire (see H.B. 436, codi-
fied at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:1 et seq., effective in 2009) ); Vermont (see S. 115, 
amending 15 V.S.A. § 8 (effective in 2009)); and the District of Columbia (see Religious 
Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act of 2009, 57 D.C. Reg. 27 Qan. 1, 
2010) (effective Mar. 3, 2010 with a three-<lay waiting period so first marriages took 
place on March 6, 2010) (codified at D.C. CODE§ 4M01 to -421)). California also rec-
ognized valid same-sex marriages provided they had been entered into before Novem-
ber 5, 2008, the date that Proposition 8 took effect (see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 
(Cal. 2009)). 
75 N.Y. TSBA-06(2)1, supra note 13, at 2-3. 
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foreign same-sex marriages would be recognized in Rhode Island, but 
then a Rhode Island court refused to recognize such a marriage for 
purposes of a divorce. 76 At the end of 2013, there were seventeen 
states, in addition to the District of Columbia, that clearly recognized 
such marriages. 77 There are, however, marriage equality cases cur-
rently in litigation involving numerous other states and some of them 
are likely to be successful, thereby adding to the number of recogni-
tion states. 78 And the Attorney General of Oregon has opined that, 
post-Windsor, Oregon must recognize valid marriages between same-
sex spouses if legally entered into.79 The status of the law is constantly 
and rapidly changing. That state of affairs would make it very difficult 
for the IRS to stay current with which states are recognition states and 
which are nonrecognition states from year to year. Determining 
whether or not a couple is legally married because their marriage oc-
curred in a state, which at the time recognized the legality of the mar-
riage, is a much simpler task. It is more likely to provide certainty and 
uniform application of tax rules, both of which are goals of tax policy. 
Most scholars who keep up with the changing legal landscape re-
garding recognition of same-sex spouses predict that it is merely a mat-
ter of time before all states will be recognition states.80 Adopting a 
policy that recognizes as many current marriages as possible is consis-
tent with this rapidly changing landscape. 
76 Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 967 (R.I. 2007) (denying divorce to couple 
married in Massachusetts; construing Rhode Island statute granting jurisdiction to fam-
ily court to grant divorces from the "bonds of marriage" to apply only to opposite-sex 
marriages). 
77 PRoCc>N.ORG, supra note 64. 
78 Post- ltlndsor, at least nine federal district judges have ruled that a state's failure to 
recognize the marriage of a same-sex couple is a violation of the equal protection 
clause. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 2014 WL 1100794 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); Tanco v. 
Haslam,_ F. Supp. 2d _, 2014 WL 997525 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14, 2014); De Leon v. 
Perry,_ F. Supp. 2d _, 2014 WL 715741 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); Lee v. Orr, 2014 
WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bostic v. Rainey,_ F. Supp. 2d _, 2014 WL 
561978. (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2014 WL 
556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder,_ F. Supp. 2d _, 2014 
WL 116013 (N.D. Okla.Jan. 4, 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013 \\TL 6834634 (D. Utah, 
Dec. 23, 2013); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, _ F. Supp. 2d _, 2013 WL 5934007 (S.D. 
Ohio, Nov. l, 2013) (Ohio state law unconstitutional). 
79 Lauren Dake, Oregon Won't Defend Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, THE BULLETIN (Feb. 21, 
2014), http:/ /www.bendbulletin.com/home/ 1810492-151 / oregon-wont-defend-ban-
on-same-sex-rnarriage. 
80 See, e.g., Ross Dou that, The Terms of Our Surrender, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2014, http:// 
www.nyti mes.corn/2014/ 03 I 02/ opinion/ sunday I the-terms-of-our-surrender. h trn 1. 
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3. A place of celebration rule simplifies determination of marital 
status by employers 
A huge burden, keeping track of an employee's domicile from 
year to year while also keeping track of whether that domicile recog-
nizes the marriage, would be placed on employers who have a large 
number of employees in different states. Employers need to know 
marital status for various purposes, but primarily to determine how 
benefits and retirement plans are to be administered.81 Health plan 
benefits for an employee's spouse, for example, are excluded from in-
come, whereas .those for mere partners are generally taxable.82 If a 
retirement plan is covered by the Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act (ERISA), any available death benefit must be paid to the em-
ployee's spouse unless the spouse has signed a waiver.83 Failure to 
comply with ERISA rules could put a plan at risk of losing its tax-ex-
empt status.84 It is not surprising that benefits lawyers were lobbying 
the IRS shortly after the Windsor decision to adopt a place of celebra-
tion rule. In their view, a place of domicile rule would be costly and 
inefficient.85 Simplicity is a tax policy value, not just for the IRS, but 
also for the taxpayer who needs to comply with the tax law. 
4. A place of celebration rule creates a more uniform rule for all 
married same-sex couples and avoids 
geographical discrimination 
U.S. tax law has been through several periods of geographical dis-
crimination among married couples. After the 1930 decision in Poe v. 
Seaborn, holding that community property spouses could split income,86 
came an uncomfortable period of geographical discrimination against 
81 An Overoiew of Federal Rights and Protections Granted to Married Couples, HUMAN 
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https:/ /www.hrc.org/ resources/ entry I an-overview-of-federal-rights-
and-protections-granted-to-married-couples (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). 
82 J.R.C. §§ 105--06 (2012) (health plan coverage for an employee's spouse and de-
pendents is excluded from income); see also Patricia A. Cain, Taxation of Domestic Partner 
Benefits: The Hidden Costs, 45 U.S.F. L. REv. 481 (2010) (a partner can qualify as a depen-
dent in certain situations, although not all employers understand this rule). 
83 U.S. Dep't of Labor, FAQs About Retirement Plans and ER/SA, http:/ /www.dol.gov/ 
ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_pension.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
84 Id. 
ss Letter from American Benefits Council to Secretary Lew, Secretary Sebelius, Acting 
Secretary Harris, and Commissioner Werfel (on file with author) (last modified July 17, 
2013), available at http:/ /www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents2013/ssm-
doma_admin-letter071713.pdf. 
86 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930). 
2014] Taxation of Same-Sex Couples 283 
spouses that lived in non-community property states. That problem 
was not solved until the Tax Act of 1948, which adopted the modern 
joint return.87 Equal treatment of spouses, regardless of domicile or 
residence, was the principle behind the 1948 Act.88 Another era of 
geographical discrimination against non-community property spouses 
began after the 1962 decision in United States v. Davis, a decision that 
held that property divisions between spouses involving a transfer of ap-
preciated property were taxable events.89 Shortly after that, commu-
nity property spouses established that they should not be taxed on 
such transactions because they were merely dividing property that was 
already jointly owned.90 In 1984, with the passage of Section 1041, that 
geographical discrimination ended.91 Today no spouse, no matter 
state of domicile or residence, will be taxed on the transfer of appreci-
ated property incident to divorce.92 
The adoption of the place of celebration rule results in a uniform 
rule that all legally married couples will be treated as married for tax 
purposes, whether that status is beneficial or harmful under the tax 
law. Domicile and residence are irrelevant.93 The common attribute 
that counts is not where you live, but whether or not you are legally 
married. And there is another important point to make here. If a le-
gally married couple lives in a nonrecognition state, that does not mean 
that they are not married. Today they are married in at least seventeen 
states.94 And even though their state of domicile may not recognize 
the marriage, it is real. Neither spouse is free to marry anyone else. At 
any time, one spouse can move to a recognition state and institute a 
87 Comment, joint Income Tax Returns Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 36 CALIF. L. REV. 
289 (1948). 
88 For a general history of how the country moved from Seaborn to joint returns, see 
Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 SANTA CIARA L. REv. 805, 806-17 (2008). 
89 370 U.S. 65, 73-74 (1962). 
90 See Carrieres v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 959 (1975), acq. in result, 1976-2 C.B. I, affd per 
curiam, 552 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that there is a nontaxable division of 
community property, but a gain is recognized to the extent separate property is ex-
changed for community interest); Rev. Ru!. 76-83, 1976-I C.B. 213 (citing additional 
cases in accord). 
91 See I.RC. § 1041 (2006). 
92 Id. 
93 Residence and domicile are different concepts. Residence is where you actually 
reside. Domicile is where you intend to live permanently (or at least for the foreseeable 
future). College students may live in Berkeley or New Haven but be domiciled in Ore-
gon or New York. See Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the Knot, 39 
WM. & MARYL. REV. l, 6-7 (1997). 
94 PRoCoN.ORG, supra note 64. 
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divorce.95 And, for those spouses who married in certain jurisdictions, 
the place of celebration will retain jurisdiction to issue a divorce.96 So 
these couples are truly married. Application of a place of celebration 
rule treats all "truly married" couples the same. 
D. Yes, the IRS was Right to Adopt Place of Celebration 
I applaud the IRS ruling for adopting place of celebration as the 
standard for determining the validity of a marriage for federal tax pur-
poses. The ruling takes a position consistent with prior IRS law. It 
takes a position that is supported by policy, and, it takes a position that 
is consistent with reality. If you are married in the State of Washington 
(a recognition state) but domiciled in Texas (a nonrecognition state), 
you are nonetheless really married. You are legally married until that 
marriage is dissolved by death or divorce. Texas may not recognize 
your marriage, but that does not mean you are not married elsewhere. 
In this mobile society of ours, that marriage is real. 
III. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE WINDSOR HOLDING 
A. Effect of the Ruling During Open Years 
The Supreme Court's ruling that DOMA is unconstitutional 
means that DOMA has always been unconstitutional.97 As a general 
rule, court decisions holding that statutes are unconstitutional are ap-
plied retroactively.98 Since DOMA was ruled unconstitutional, it is no 
longer effective and should not be effective for any open tax year 
under the statute of limitations. 
95 After establishing any residency requirements that might apply. 
96 Married same-sex couples living in nonrecognition states are often unable to ob-
tain a divorce. That is because the state in which they live will not even recognize the 
marriage for purposes of granting a divorce. In addition, states that would grant the 
couple a divorce generally require a minimum"period of domicile or residence by at 
least one of the spouses. To remedy this situation, a growing number of recognition 
states have enacted legislation that will allow the court of that state to retain jurisdiction 
over a couple who was married in that state solely for purposes of granting them a 
divorce in the event the spouses find themselves unable to obtain a divorce in their 
current domicile. Those states are California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Min-
nesota, Oregon, and Vermont. Similar laws have also been enacted by the District of 
Columbia and by Canada. For specifics of how these laws work, see Divorce for Same-Sex 
Couples Who Live in Non-Recognition States: A Guide For Attorneys, NAT'L CTR. FOR LESBIAN 
RIGHTS, http:/ /www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07 /Divorce_in_DOMA_ 
States_Attorney_Guide.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
97 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). 
98 See 16A AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law§ 195 (2009). 
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IRC Section 7805(b) (8) provides, "[t]he Secretary may prescribe 
the extent, if any, to which any ruling (including any judicial decision 
or any administrative determination other than by regulation) relating 
to the internal revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive ef-
fect."99 So, does this mean the IRS could have ruled that Windsorwould 
only be applied prospectively? No, because the ruling was applied to 
Edie Windsor retroactively, giving her a tax refund. 100 It would be diffi-
cult to find any justification for not applying it to any other married 
same-sex couple that could file a refund in the same way that she did. 
The real issue under Section 7805 is whether the IRS should apply 
the rule only prospectively to those who relied on DOMA. In other 
words, prospective application would prevent the IRS from asserting 
marriage tax penalties against the many same-sex married couples that 
reported as single taxpayers relying on DOMA. 101 And, in fact, the IRS 
did rule in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 that Windsor would generally be 
applied only prospectively to those who had relied on it. 102 No married 
couple would be required to amend a return and recompute their tax 
liability on ajoint return. 103 At the same time, any taxpayer who would 
benefit from amending a return, i.e., who was in the same position as 
Edie Windsor was, would be allowed to amend so long as the statute of 
limitations had not run on the year at issue. 104 
This certainly appears to be the fair thing to do. After all, couples 
have relied on a law that Congress passed and which the IRS continued 
to enforce even as serious questions about its constitutionality were 
99 I.RC.§ 7805(b)(8) (2006). 
100 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682. 
101 See Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 748 n.4 (2004), in which 
the Court noted that the Secretary had the power to apply the Court's ruling on a tax 
matter prospectively only and that it would be equitable to do so in the current case. 
Retroactive application might have disqualified a number of ERISA plans that had re-
lied on instructions from the IRS that the Court ruled invalid. Similarly, prospective 
application to couples who have relied on DOMA in filing past returns would be 
equitable. 
102 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
103 As a general rule, taxpayers are not required to amend returns. Treasury Regula-
tion Section 1.451-1 (a) provides: "If a taxpayer ascertains that an item should have been 
included in gross income in a prior taxable year, he should ... file an amended return 
and pay any additional tax due." Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1 (a) (1977). Despite this regula-
tion, as a general matter, a taxpayer has no legal obligation to file an amended return. 
See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE§ 207.4.l (3d ed. 1995). See 
also P.H. Glatfelter Co. v. Lewis, 746 F. Supp. 511, 519 n.23 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (affirming 
this understanding of the taxpayer's lack of obligation). 
104 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.RB. 201. 
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raised. 105 To suddenly be exposed to a marriage tax penalty that could 
run into tens of thousands of dollars could upset settled expectations. 
No one is required to file an amended return. The real threat was 
whether or not the IRS would ever assert, in an audit or otherwise, that 
a couple legally married who had filed as single, following the rule of 
DOMA, could be subjected by the IRS to penalties for not filing as 
married. The 2013 ruling, although not explicit on this point, does 
appear to remove that threat. And the informal guidance that the IRS 
has provided, both in writing106 and orally, 107 supports the conclusion 
that the agency wants to do what is fair. 
In support of the IRS position, it is worth pointing out that this 
sort of position, i.e., letting those who benefit claim one position and 
those who do not claim a different one, is not without precedent. 
While it is rare for a tax provision to be ruled unconstitutional, a simi-
lar situation arose in the 1980s regarding the constitutionality of cer-
tain Social Security provisions that were linked to provisions in the 
Internal Revenue Code about how to allocate the tax and the earnings 
credits for self-employment income earned by a spouse in a commu-
nity property state.108 Section 1402 of the Internal Revenue Code (and 
the related Social Security provision) 109 used to provide that any self-
employment income earned by a community property couple would 
presumptively be the income of the husband. 110 The point of the stat-
ute was to avoid splitting the income 50/50 under the Seaborn deci-
105 See Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on Litigation Involving the De-
fense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), availab/,e at http://wwwJustice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2011/February/ll-ag-223.html (announcing that the Justice Department would no 
longer defend DOMA because it believed the statute was unconstitutional). Nonethe-
less, as the letter explained, federal agencies would continue to enforce the statute until 
a court made the final determination as to constitutionality or until Congress repealed 
the law. 
106 See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions fur Individuals of the Same Sex Who Are Married 
Under State Law, IRS.Gov (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-to-Fre-
quently-Asked-Questions-for-Same-Sex-Married-Couples. 
101 Several tax practitioners, including this author, have spoken with the co-authors of 
Revenue Ruling 2013-17 to ask for additional clarity and have been told that the IRS 
intends to do what is fair. Thus, if a taxpayer wants to amend for one prior year and not 
another, that is fine. If only one of the spouses wants to amend and not the other one, 
that is also fine. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
10s See, e.g., Edwards v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1985). 
10'.l Social Security Act§ 211 (a) (5)(A), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 411 (a) (5)(A) (West 
2008). 
1101.R.C. § 1402(a)(5)(A) (West 2010). 
2014] Taxation of Same-Sex Couples 287 
sion 111 and to assign it to the spouse who, in Congress's view when it 
passed the legislation in 1950, was the more likely earner. 
In the 1980s, after decisions such as Craig v. Boren112 and Califano v. 
Goldfarb, 113 wives who were retiring challenged the sex discrimination 
inherent in assigning all earnings to the husband even if the wife 
might have been engaged in the business, or indeed even run it her-
self. And they won. The Secretary of HHS fairly quickly agreed that 
the statutes at issue were unconstitutional. 114 That decision left only 
the question of remedy. How should the earnings credits be reallo-
cated to account for the fact that they had been misallocated for years? 
The Secretary of HHS appears to have adopted a similar "hold harm-
less" rule. 115 Couples were free to decide for themselves whether or 
not the earlier earnings should be reallocated or whether the status 
quo should be maintained. 116 In effect, if the new rule created a bene-
fit, spouses could elect to be covered under the new rule. If the old 
rule produced a better result for the couple, then the spouses could 
elect to be covered by the old rule. 117 
B. Can Equity Toll the Statute of Limitations? 
For all tax refund claims, there is a general statute of limitations of 
three years, typically measured from the date the return should have 
been filed to be timely, or in some cases three years from the date 
actually filed. 118 Some tax professionals have questioned whether or 
not a strict application of this three-year statutory period is sufficiently 
fair, given the fact that this was, after all, a discriminatory statute that 
111 In this author's view, the special rule assigning the income to the husband was 
unnecessary because there was no reason for the Seab<Yrn decision to apply to self-em-
ployment income. Seab<Yrn determined that income taxation was based on ownership of 
the income. If community property rules made the spouses equal owners, then the 
income tax liability should be split between them. But the self-employment tax is not 
about ownership of the income. The statutory language of Section 1402 focuses on the 
earner of the income, not the owner. In any event, concerned about whether Seaborn 
would apply or not, Congress elected to overmle Seabom and assign the income to the 
husband rather than saying it should be assigned to the earner. 
112 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
113 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
114 See Edwards v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1985). 
115 /d. at 664. 
116 /d. 
117 Jd. 
0 
11s See l.R.C. § 651 (West 2008) (stating that if the taxpayer takes advantage of the 
automatic six-month extension in order to file after April 15 then the limitations period 
nms from the date of filing). 
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was ultimately ruled unconstitutional. 119 The argument appears to be 
based on the claim that since the statute was always unconstitutional 
but was nonetheless being enforced by the IRS, it would have been 
unreasonable to expect a taxpayer to file a claim for refund at a time 
when existing case law had universally upheld DOMA.12° 
A similar question was raised in the Social Security litigation from 
the 1980s. Under the Social Security laws, an individual was allowed to 
request an amendment of his or her income records to correct an er-
ror or an omission, but only within the applicable statute of limita-
tions.121 The district court in Edwards had ruled that it would be 
inequitable to apply this statute of limitations to the individuals who 
had been harmed by the discriminatory law. 122 And the court of ap-
peals affirmed, saying: "The district court ... has broad discretion to 
fashion a remedy which 'restore [s] ... victims of discriminatory con-
duct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such 
conduct,"' and citing Milliken v. Bradl,ey, 123 a 1977 Supreme Court 
opinion. 124 
Secretary Heckler then argued that if the new rule was going to be 
applied retroactively, "the period of retroactivity should be limited to 
the period in which the result was 'clearly foreshadowed' by previous 
sex discrimination cases." 125 The court of appeals disagreed, thereby 
opening up all prior earnings years and allowing all claimants to 
amend for whatever retroactive period they elected. 126 The court cited 
to an earlier Social Security case127 also involving a claim of sex discrim-
ination, in which the district court had to decide whether a new rule 
(extending benefits to fathers who had lost a worker spouse that previ-
ously had only been available to mothers who had lost a worker 
spouse), which was established as of 1975 by a Supreme Court deci-
119 See, e.g., George D. Karibjanian, "WELL, THAT CERTAINLY RESOLVED EVERY-
THING . .. "SAME SEX PLANNING IN A POST-WINDSOR AND PERRY WORLD, SV030 
ALI-ABA 367, 493 (2013). 
120 See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. 
Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
121 See42 U.S.C.A. § 405(c) (l)(B), (c) (4) (West 2010) (stating that the statute of limi-
tations is three years, three months, and fifteen days from the end of the taxable year, 
i.e., April 15, usually). 
122 Edwards, 789 F.2d at 664. 
123433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
124 Edwards, 789 F.2d at 664. 
12s Id. 
126 Id. 
121 Id. (citing Hurvich v. Califano, 457 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1978)). 
2014] Taxation of Same-Sex Couples 289 
sion, 128 could be applied to years prior to 1975. The district court held 
that it could. 129 But in that case the father had actually applied for the 
benefits upon his wife's death in 1969. 130 He had been denied and so 
renewed the claim in 1975. 131 The district court ruled that he was enti-
tled to benefits going back to 1969, his original application dateY2 
Altogether these Social Security cases appear to support a claim 
that it would be inequitable to apply the normal statute of limitations 
to claims by same-sex couples that wish to amend and file joint returns 
for years that are closed under the statute of limitations. But, there are 
also important distinctions. In the Hurvich case (father initially denied 
widower's benefits), the claimant had actually made a claim to the ben-
efits.133 Under Social Security law, a beneficiary is not entitled to bene-
fits until he or she makes a claim. 134 Under tax law, this should mean 
that you would have had to make a timely claim to file jointly, either 
under an original return, or under an amended return. The Social 
Security cases, read together, do not stand for the broad principle that 
a court can ignore the statute of limitations whenever the claim for 
refund is based on a determination that a tax law is unconstitutional. 
Instead, the question to ask is whether the application of the stat-
ute of limitations in this case violates due process. 135 The statute is 
three years, but the administrative practice is to allow taxpayers to file 
protective claims if there is ongoing litigation that might change the 
law affecting that tax year. 136 So, when should someone have consid-
ered filing a protective claim? Marriages were not available to same-sex 
couples in this country until 2004. 137 A 2004 tax return should have 
been filed by April 15, 2005, and thus the three-year statute of limita-
tions to amend it would normally have run by April 15, 2008. It wasn't 
12s Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
12'J Huroich, 457 F. Supp. at 764-65. 
130 Id. at 761. 
131 Id. 
i32 Id. at 764-65. 
133 Id. at 761. 
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006). 
i3r, See Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100-02 (1993) (discussing Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 ( 1971) and concluding that retroactive versus prospective 
application of new rule created by court decision is a question best analyzed under a 
due process analysis). 
i:iG Comment, Protective Claims for Refund: Protecting the Interests of Taxpayers and the IRS, 
56 ME. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
131 However, they were available in foreign countries earlier, e.g., in Canada as of 
2003. 
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until the two successful DOMA challenges from Massachusetts, de-
cided in 2010, 138 that the general public began to think it was actually 
possible to win a DOMA challenge. But some of the plaintiffs in the 
Massachusetts case brought by GLAAD139 were making claims for tax 
year 2004. 140 Since they were able to file their claims within the statute 
of limitations period, their situation is some evidence that the limita-
tions period is not unreasonable. Besides, the Supreme Court has ap-
proved shorter statutes of limitation as meeting the requirements of 
due process. 141 
In conclusion, I doubt that a court will equitably toll the normal 
statute of limitations in this case. The IRS has thus correctly deter-
mined that taxpayers who want to amend are free to do so. But those 
claims for refunds must be filed within the applicable statute of limita-
tions period. 
C. What about Equitabl.e Recoupment? 
There is a doctrine called equitable recoupment that might be 
available to provide some equitable relief to the statute of limitations 
problem. It would require an expansion of the doctrine as it is cur-
rently understood. However, given the IRS position that the agency 
wants to do what is fair in light of the unconstitutionality of DOMA, it 
is an avenue worth exploring. 
This doctrine typically applies when the IRS is going after the tax-
payer for a tax that is owed on the IRS's theory of a particular transac-
tion.142 Assume the taxpayer had reported the transaction in a 
different manner and paid a tax on that transaction according to the 
138 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). 
139 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 374. 
140 Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or 
Other Relief and for Review of Agency Action at, 205, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 
F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-10309), 2010 WL 2826297. 
14 1 See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, Dep't of Bus. Regu-
lation of Fla., 496 U.S. 18, 45 (1990) (holding that a state that had wrongly taxed busi-
nesses under an unconstitutional tax provision had to provide retroactive relief of some 
sort, such as a refund of the unconstitutional taxes). The Court also said that there were 
various limitations that a state might put on the right to a refund including "relatively 
short statutes of limitations applicable to such actions .... " See also Stone Container 
Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing McKesson and 
upholding a two-year statute of limitations as applied to a refund request for prior pay-
ment of what turned out to be an unconstitutional tax). 
142 See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 602--03 (1990). 
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taxpayer's theory. Now it is some years later and the IRS is claiming 
the transaction is subject to a different tax. For example, assume the 
taxpayer reported a wealth transfer to herself as a taxable gift and she 
agreed to and did pay a gift tax on the transfer. Some years later, the 
IRS timely charges that the transfer was actually income to the recipi-
ent and assesses an income tax. The statute of limitations for claiming 
a refund on the gift tax has passed. If the IRS wins on its income tax 
claim, the taxpayer may be able to claim the prior gift tax paid as an 
offset to the amount of income tax owed, even though she could not 
file a new suit making a refund claim. 143 
In a recent Tax Court case, the requirements for a successful equi-
table recoupment claim were summarized as follows: 
(1) the overpayment or deficiency for which recoupment is sought by way 
of offset is barred by an expired period of limitation; (2) the time-barred 
overpayment or deficiency arose out of the same transaction, item, or 
taxable event as the overpayment or deficiency before the Court; (3) the 
transaction, item, or taxable event has been inconsistently subjected to 
two taxes; and ( 4) if the transaction, item, or taxable event involves two or 
more taxpayers, there is sufficient identity of interest between the taxpay-
ers subject to the two taxes that the taxpayers should be treated as one. 144 
The doctrine is limited. It clearly would not support a claim for a re-
fund. It is an equitable remedy. 145 The remedy is an offset. 146 The 
offset amount is the amount of tax that should not have been paid if 
the original transaction had been correctly reported. 147 Here is an ex-
ample of how the doctrine might be applied to same-sex married 
couples that may have overpaid a tax: 
Assume that A and B were legally married in Massachusetts. In 
2006, A made a taxable gift to B, taxable only because the marital de-
duction was not available because of DOMA. As a result A paid a gift 
tax of $x. The three-year statute of limitations has run, preventing A 
from claiming a refund of the gift tax paid. Now assume that A dies in 
2013 leaving a taxable estate that produces an estate tax of $x, even 
after taking into account the marital deduction for gifts to B. The es-
143 See id. at 608-10 (1990) (taxpayer could not file a refund claim for the gift tax 
although she might have been entitled to claim the earlier tax paid as an offset to the 
income tax assessed); Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935) (equitable recoupment 
allowed in a similar situation). 
144 See K & K Veterinary Supply, Inc. v. Comm'r, 84 T.C.M. *31 (2013). 
145 Id. at *13. 
14& Id. 
147 Id. at * 13-14. 
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tate tax is computed on aggregate lifetime and deathtime giving. 148 
The tax base, correctly computed at death in 2013, should exclude all 
gratuitous transfers to a spouse. If A's estate computes the final tax 
base correctly under Windsor, the gift in 2006 should not be part of that 
tax base. Under equitable recoupment, the estate cannot claim a re-
fund of $x taxes paid on that gift. But if the estate's tax base, exclud-
ing the 2006 gift to a spouse, produces an estate tax of $x, might the 
estate claim an offset for the taxes paid on the 2006 gift, even though 
the statute of limitations for a claim for refund has run? It would be a 
stretch of the doctrine of equitable recoupment, to be sure. But such a 
result would be in keeping with the basic premise that same-sex 
couples should be held harmless from the application of an unconsti-
tutional law. 149 
There is additional evidence that the IRS intends to provide wide 
relief to taxpayers who may have relied on DOMA to their detriment. 
In early 2014, the IRS issued a revenue procedure that specifically ben-
efits same-sex married couples that may have relied on DOMA. 150 Rev-
enue Procedure 2014-18 announces a deadline extension for married 
148 Smith v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 872, 879 (1990). 
149There is additional indirect support for this outcome in Rev. Rul. 76-451, 1976-2 
C.B. 304. In this ruling a taxpayer had mistakenly claimed his lifetime gift tax exemp-
tion of $30,000 (pre-1976) against gifts to his spouse on which he failed to claim the 
then available marital deduction of fifty percent. In a later tax year, he was allowed to 
recoup the unnecessarily claimed exemption amount from the earlier years and to use 
it in a current year. This recoupment of the exemption should be available either in a 
current gift tax return or an estate tax return. The statute of limitations does not pre-
vent correction of the current tax base by recalculating how much of the exemption 
amount was actually used in a prior year. Nothing in this ruling, however, addresses the 
question of recoupment of wrongly paid gift taxes. 
Note that the validity of this ruling has been called into question by the Internal 
Revenue Sernce Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 2627, I05th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 1998), which provided in Section 2504 that the value of any gift for gift tax pur-
poses would be finalized if the provisions of that section were followed. The proposed 
regulations under that section initially included a reference to Rev. Rul. 76-451, which 
suggested that only valuation issues (i.e., questions of fact) would be subject to the 
three-year statute of limitations and that legal questions (e.g., was this a gift of a present 
interest or not) would not be subject to the three-year statute. In response to criticism 
from practitioners, the IRS changed the regulations before finalizing them. The regula-
tions currently state that both issues of fact (value) and issues of law (e.g., was this a gift 
of a present interest) are covered by the three-year statute. The desire was to have final-
ity regarding gift tax liability, both on issues of valuation and on issues of legal construc-
tion of statutes. But, even though the reference to Rev. Rul. 76-451 has been removed 
from the final regulations, there has been no pronouncement that the ruling is obso-
lete or otherwise not good law. Technically, then, it is still good law. 
150 Rev. Proc. 2014-18, 2014-7 I.RB. 513. 
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couples that may not have elected the benefits of "portability" 151 for 
estate tax purposes. 152 Portability benefits must be elected by filing an 
estate tax return for the first spouse to die. 153 Estate tax returns are 
due nine months after death. 154 If a Massachusetts same-sex spouse 
died in 2010 with a non-taxable estate, it might have seemed a costly 
option to file what would basically have been a protective claim to the 
portability benefit. The cost in this case would have been the cost of 
filing an otherwise unnecessary federal estate tax return, which would 
have had to include all the details and appraisals necessary for filing 
such a return. Now, however, post-Windsor, we know that the return 
would in fact gain the portability benefit. Realizing the issues inherent 
in this sort of decision-making, the IRS issued this 2014 revenue proce-
dure, giving all deceased estates an extension to December 31, 2014, in 
which to file a return claiming portability. 155 
IV. How SHOULD REGISTERED DOMESTIC PARTNERS AND CIVIL UNION 
PARTNERS BE TREATED? 
While I think the IRS generally "got it right" in adopting a place of 
celebration rule and a "hold harmless" stance with respect to retroac-
tive application of Windsor, I am less certain that the ruling is correct 
with respect to the tax treatment of Registered Domestic Partners 
(RDPs) and Civil Union Partners (CUPs). To be sure, there are good 
arguments on both sides of this issue. Let me outline them first. 
lf>I Id. "Portability" is a new concept under the Estate Tax. Basically, it provides that if 
the first spouse to die did not use his or her exemption amount (in 2014 at $3.43 
million) then the estate can file an estate tax return and elect for that exemption to be 
available to the surviving spouse-in addition to the exemption amount available to the 
surviving spouse. Here's a simple example to explain the benefit: Assume that each 
spouse has $5 million in assets. The $5+ million exemption means that each spouse can 
give that much to his/her kids (or to anyone) tax-free. But now assume that Spouse A 
leaves everything to Spouse B. Now Spouse B has $10M in assets-an amount in excess 
of the exemption amount. Spouse B will therefore incur an estate tax. But, under porta-
bility, if a proper election is made on an estate tax return filed by Spouse A's estate 
(even though the estate is below the exemption amount, it must file a retu~n to gain 
this benefit for the survivor) then Spouse B can add to his or her exemption amount 
the unused exemption amount of Spouse A. 
lf•2 /d. 
1r.3 Id. 
lMfd. 
1r.s Id. The Revenue Procedure specially mentions the Windsor dilemma (i.e., should a 
taxpayer file a return for a benefit during a period in time when the benefit was denied 
to same-sex spouses), but it also extends the benefit to all spouses, which seems totally 
equitable given the newness of this election. 
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A. "'7iy RDPs and CVPs should not be treated as spouses for federal 
tax purposes 
1. There are state cases that say that such partnerships are not the 
same as marriages 
A couple of individuals at the IRS have explained to me 156 that the 
justification for not treating RDPs and CUPs as spouses is that the IRS 
wanted to honor the state's determination that these relationships 
were not marriages. Despite the fact that such relationships are ac-
corded all the rights and responsibilities of marriage, both the Califor-
nia Supreme Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court have ruled 
that such relationships are not equal to marriage. 157 The state does not 
denominate partners as spouses. 158 State law controls for determining 
marital status for federal tax purposes. 159 As a result, the federal gov-
ernment should not construe the word "spouse" to include registered 
domestic partners or civil union partners, or any other formal relation-
ship that a state may recognize that is legislatively created as an alterna-
tive to marriage. 
2. Partners in such partnerships may have relied on the fact that 
their relationships are not marriages for purposes of 
federal law 
Registered domestic partners and civil union partners have never 
before been treated as married for purposes of federal laws that apply 
only to marriage. 160 Since there are many ways that tax laws can nega-
tively impact a married couple, some couples may choose to register 
rather than marry. Those couples ought to be allowed to continue to 
rely on the assumption that they are not spouses for federal purposes. 
Opposite sex couples that have registered their partnerships have re-
lied on the assumption that they are not married for federal tax pur-
156 The conversations were private and the remarks were not for attribution. 
157 See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008) (holding that since RDP relation-
ships are not equal to marriage, it is a violation of the California Constitution to ex-
clude same-sex couples from marriage); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that since civil unions are not equal to marriage, it is a 
violation of the California Constitution to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. 
158 Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.RB. 201. 
159 Jd. 
160 This is true, despite the widely-reported letter from the IRS Office of Chief Coun-
sel to an accountant in Illinois concluding that opposite-sex civil union partners should 
file as married because state law treated them the same as spouses. See Amy Elliot, IRS 
Memo Indicates Civil Unions Are Marriages for Tax Purposes, 133 TAX NOTES WEEKLY 794 
(Nov. 14, 2011). 
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poses. 161 If they want to be treated as spouses, of course, they are free 
to marry. Now that the IRS has adopted a place of celebration rule to 
determine the validity of a marriage, same-sex couples are similarly 
free to choose between marriage in a recognition state or some other 
form of relationship recognition. 162 
3. How to tax RDPs and CUPs is a complex policy question that 
ought to be addressed by Congress rather than the IRS 
Currently RDPs and CUPs are taxed as single people, but to the 
extent they have certain property rights under state law (e.g., commu-
nity property or other marital property rights), the IRS must recognize 
those property rights. 163 In the past, before DOMA, Congress and the 
IRS always relied on state family law to determine who should be 
treated as married. 164 Registered partnerships and civil unions are rela-
tively new. 165 In addition, there are other types of relationships that are 
recognized by some states. 166 Determining how all of these different 
relationships should be treated for federal tax purposes is a complex 
matter and best handled by Congress. 
161 See James Angelini, The Federal and State Taxation of Domestic Partner Benefits, TAX 
ANALYSTS (Nov. 8, 2011), http:/ /www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/ Articles/03CE 
C7C26C62E94A852579420059DC81 ?Open Document. California recognizes opposite-
sex RDPs, but only if one of the partners is at least age sixty-two. Colorado, Hawaii, 
Illinois, and Nevada all recognize opposite-sex partners regardless of age. 
162 See Joseph Henchman, IRS Issues "State of Celebration" Guidance for Same-Sex Couples -
Further Guidance by 24 States May Be Required, TAX FOUND. (Aug. 29, 2013), http:// 
taxfoundation.org/article/irs-issues-state-celebration-guidance-same-sex-couples-fur-
ther-guidance-24-states-may-be-required. For example, anyone can register as domestic 
partners in the State of California. As with marriage, there is no requirement that the 
couple or either partner be a resident. Angelini, supra note 161. 
163 See I.RS. C.C.A. 201021050 (May 28, 2010) (stating that Seaborn applies to RDPs 
subject to a community property regime). 
164 Rev. Ru!. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.RB. 201. 
l65 See generally Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT'L CoNF. OF ST. LEGISI.A-
TURES, http:/ /www.ncsl.org/ research/human-services/ civil-unions-and-domestic-part-
nership-statutes.aspx (last updated Feb. 26, 2014). 
166 Wisconsin, for example, recognizes registered partners, but does not treat them as 
equivalent to spouses. They have only a handful of marital rights. Hawaii recognizes a 
relationship called "reciprocal beneficiaries," that is not intended as an alternative to 
marriage. Instead, it is available to people who cannot marry, such as mother and 
daughter. This status also accords only a handful of rights to the registered couple. See 
id. 
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B. Why RDPs and CUPs should be treated as spouses for federal 
tax purposes 
1. Such a distinction creates a tax avoidance situation 
The policy question at the core of this issue is: why do we tax 
spouses as a unit? The apparent answer is that we do so in order to 
avoid the application of Poe v. Seaborn and thereby tax all spouses the 
same regardless of geographical distinctions in marital property laws. 167 
However, that same type of geographical discrimination is created now 
for same-sex couples who are registered and live in community prop-
erty states. 168 Under C.C.A. 201021050, partners in such states can split 
all of their community income equally between them and file as sin-
gle.169 In most cases this will produce a tax that is lower than if the 
couple filed as married. This confluence of state law and federal non-
recognition of the relationship creates an easy route for tax avoidance 
in such situations. It would be better as a matter of tax policy to treat 
such relationships the same as marriages. 
2. RDPs and CUPs are treated as married for state tax purposes 
While it is true that state courts have ruled that registered partner-
ships are not equal to marriages, 170 that is not the same thing as saying 
they should not be treated as marriages. In fact, at the state level, with 
the exception of Colorado, 171 every state that recognizes a spousal 
equivalency status treats registered partners as spouses for state tax 
purposes. 172 Requiring registered couples to file as single at the federal 
level and as married at the state level creates waste in the overall tax 
system. Such couples end up paying more to tax return preparers and 
167 See Cain, supra note 88, at 808. 
168 See generally I.RS. C.C.A. 201021050 (May 28, 2010); NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLA-
TURES, supra note 165 (At the moment, such states include California and Nevada. 
Washington, also a community property state, used to recognize registered partners, 
but is now converting those partnerships into marriage, except in cases in which one of 
the partners is at least age sixty-two). 
169 I.R.S. C.C.A. 201021050 (May 28, 2010). 
170 See In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008) (holding that since RDP relation-
ships are not equal to marriage, it is a violation of the California Constitution to ex-
clude same-sex couples from marriage); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 
407 (Conn. 2008) (holding that since civil unions are not equal to marriage, it is a 
violation of the California Constitution to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. 
171 Cow. REv. STAT.§ 14-15-117 (2013). 
172 E.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.340 (2008). But c.f NEV. &."V. STAT. § 122A.010 et seq. 
(2009) (Nevada, which recognizes RDP status, says nothing about taxation at the state 
level because Nevada has no income tax). 
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impose burdens and costs on state taxing authorities. The simpler and 
fairer solution overall would be to treat such couples as married for tax 
purposes even if not married for other federal purposes. 
3. Some states are automatically converting registered partnerships 
to marriages 
Recently, a number of states that used to recognize spousal 
equivalency relationships for same-sex couples have enacted marriage 
equality legislation. 173 Although a couple of states will continue to rec-
ognize partners who registered prior to the enactment of marriage 
equality, many states are automatically converting the prior relation-
ship (registered domestic partnership or civil union) into a mar-
riage.174 And the conversion is retroactive. 175 Thus, for example, as of 
June 30, 2014, all same-sex RDPs in the State of Washington (unless 
one partner is at least sixty-two) will become married and the date of 
the marriage will be the date of the registration, which might have 
been years in the past. 176 
This phenomenon not only proves that the states really do think 
such partners are the same as spouses, but it also creates several 
problems under the IRS ruling. For example, assume that A and B 
registered as partners in the State of Washington in 2009. They have 
been filing their federal tax returns as single, but they would be better 
off filing as married. Can they now file amended returns for 2009 and 
beyond? Or, must they wait until June 30, 2014? They also have the 
option to apply for a marriage license now. Still, under state law, al-
though the marriage may be solemnized in 2013, the effective date of 
the marriage will be 2009. Will the IRS treat them as married for 2009? 
If the IRS treated RDPs as spouses, these issues would disappear. 
4. At least one state recognizes registered partners as spouses 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts recognizes registered part-
ners as spouses under state law. 177 Thus, if a registered partner from 
California moves to Massachusetts, she is not free to marry because 
Massachusetts views her as already married. 178 And, if she wants to dis-
173 See generally NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISIATURES, supra note 165. 
174 fd. 
175WAsH. REv. ConE § 26.60.100 (2012). 
116 Id. 
177 See Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17, 18 (Mass. Af'.P· Ct. 2012). 
178 See id. 
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solve her relationship, she must get a divorce, because under the laws 
of Massachusetts, she is married. 179 Will the IRS apply the law of Massa-
chusetts (state of domicile) to determine that the couple is married or 
the law of California (state of celebration of the original relationship)? 
If the IRS will treat the relationship as a marriage, what is the effective 
date, date of registration or date the couple moved to Massachusetts? 
These complex issues could similarly be avoided if the IRS merely con-
strued the word "spouse" to include spousal equivalents. 
5. There is great uncertainty in the tax law as to how RDPs and 
CUPs should be taxed if they are not taxed as spouses 
Currently, there is great uncertainty as to how RDPs and CUPs 
should be taxed. The tax laws do not mention registered partners. 
There are no special rules for them. That means they are treated the 
same as cohabitants, for whom there are also no rules. The issue for 
RDPs and CUPs is more difficult however because marriage rules apply 
to them.1so They are obligated to support each other. 1s1 Presumably 
any fulfillment of that state-imposed obligation would not be a taxable 
gift, whereas supporting a mere cohabitant does create a taxable gift. 1.82 
When RDPs and CUPs dissolve their relationships they are subject to 
the same property division and alimony rules as spouses. We have a 
number of special statutory provisions that determine how property 
divisions and alimony arrangements should be taxed. 1s3 But the stat-
utes only apply to "spouses." Spouses have clarity about the tax treat-
ment of their dissolutions. Registered partners do not. This type of 
uncertainty is not good tax policy. Treating partners as spouses would 
bring them certainty. 
179 See id. at 22; see also Hunter v. Rose, 463 Mass. 488 (2012). 
180 See generally NAT'L CoNF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 165. 
181 See id. 
182 See Rev. Rul. 82-98, 1982-1 C.B. 141 (parent support of adult disabled child held as 
taxable gifts); see also Robert G. Popovich, Suppart Your Family, but Leave out Uncle Sam: A 
Call for Federal Gift Tax Reform, 55 MD. L. REv. 343 (1996). But see Patricia A. Cain, Same-
Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, l LAw & SEXUAL.In' 97 (1991) (arguing that support 
payments by one partner for the joint consumption of both partners should not be 
viewed as taxable gifts because they are not transfers of property and such payments do 
not constitute the sort of estate-depleting transfers that the gift tax was intended to 
cover). 
18~ See I.R.C. §§ 71, 215, 1041 (2014). 
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6. Developing case law supports treating RDPs and CUPs as spouses 
for purposes of federal law 
The IRS's failure to treat RDPs and CUPs as spouses is almost cer-
tain to be challenged in litigation. While RDPs and CUPs going for-
ward can choose to marry and thus receive recognition as spouses 
under the federal tax law, that option is not available to resolve claims 
based on past events. For example, if a registered couple is in the 
midst of dissolution, might the uncertainty of the tax treatment of 
their property division drive them to hastily marry so that they can di-
vorce at the same time they dissolve the partnership? 184 That solution 
to the tax problem seems a bit extreme. And besides, if they were mar-
ried for one month, but had been registered for ten years, would the 
IRS determine independently that only a portion of the property set-
tlement, the minimal part attributable to the one-month marriage, 
qualified for tax-free treatment under Section 1041? This issue could 
be litigated in the future. And if the dissolution is final and one part-
ner is paying alimony that otherwise would qualify for a deduction 
under Section 215, but the IRS denies the deduction, that would pre-
sent a litigable issue. Finally, of course, there are registered partners 
who may have died, leaving behind a surviving partner who might want 
some of the benefits that a surviving spouse would have, such as the 
marital deduction. 
While there is no case directly on point, there is a recently pub-
lished opinion by a Ninth Circuit panel that held that RDPs should 
have the same federal employment benefits as spouses. 185 After all, if 
the couple is treated the same as a spousal unit under state law, what is 
the justification for the federal government to treat the couple differ-
ently? The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that there is no sufficient 
justification for this differential treatment. 186 This published opinion is 
not a court opinion in a litigated case. 187 It is an administrative deci-
sion by the Executive Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council 
in an appeal of an employee's complaint of discrimination by her em-
184 A couple that is both registered and married would need to dissolve both 
relationships. 
185 See In re Fonberg, 736 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2013); see also Dragovich v. 
U.S. Dep't of Treas., 872 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (court did not hold that 
RDPs should automatically be treated as spouses for tax purposes, but did rule that a tax 
statute that included spouses and numerous other relatives was unconstitutional for its 
failure to include registered partners). 
186 See Fonberg, 736 F.3d at 903. 
187 Id. at 901. 
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ployer, a federal districtjudge in Oregon. 188 Oregon recognizes regis-
tered domestic partners and basically extends to them all the same 
rights and responsibilities as spouses. 189 After Windsor, the Office of 
Personnel Management announced that spousal benefits would be ex-
tended to all federal employees in a same-sex marriage, provided they 
were married, but benefits would not be extended to registered domes-
tic partners. 190 Based on this administrative position, the district court 
refused to extend spousal benefits to the registered domestic partner 
of the court's employee. 191 The employee appealed that denial and the 
executive committee Qudges Kozinski, Clifton, and Beistline) agreed 
with the employee, finding that the agency's position was discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex and, under Windsor, constituted a deprivation 
of due process and equal protection. 192 
With this opinion available, it is likely that other RDPs will pursue 
past benefits that they have been denied. Why not avoid the contro-
versy and accept the Ninth Circuit's analysis and rule that the word 
"spouse" will include registered partners, so long as they are spousal 
equivalents? 
C. Pro or Con? Which Side Wins? 
The Ninth Circuit panel opinion makes sense to me. If spouses 
and partners are sufficiently similarly situated, then they should be 
treated the same under our tax laws. I do think the case would be 
harder to make, claiming a denial of equal protection, if the plaintiff 
were litigating for rights that he or she could have obtained by mar-
rying after June 26, 2013. In such a case, the individual is not really 
being denied the benefit because of the partnership status but is being 
denied the benefit because of a failure to take steps to marry-a course 
of action totally available to same-sex partners after June 26, 2013. But, 
even if equal protection would be harder to argue successfully, I think 
188 See id. 
189 See Oregon Family Fairness Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 106.300-.340 (2013). 
190 See OFF. OF PERS. MGMT., BENEFITS AnMIN. LETTER No. 13-203, COVERAGE OF SAME-
SEx SrousEs (2013). 
191 See Fonberg, 736 F.3d at 902 ("[O]n March 6, 2013, Chief Judge Aiken rescinded her 
directive to the Clerk to reimburse Fonberg '[b)ecause no legal method for reimburse-
ment is currently available ... [and] the law affords Fonberg no remedy in this matter.' 
Chief Judge Aiken further ruled that, because Fonberg and her partner are not mar-
ried, there was no authority within the Ninth Circuit to permit her to order reimburse-
ment of the cost of health benefits for Fon berg's domestic partner."). 
192 Id. at 903. 
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as a matter of sound tax policy, it makes sense to treat partners as 
spouses. Such treatment would bring all committed couples that are 
subject to the same marital regimes in the various states under the 
same tax regime. It would create certainty for couples that otherwise 
are unsure how their inter-partner transactions will be taxed. And, it 
would end the geographical disparity between registered partners in 
community property states and registered partners in other states. 193 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Windsor decision created a huge shift in tax treatment of 
same-sex spouses, but there are still many unresolved issues. Revenue 
Ruling 2013-17 is a step in the right direction as it resolves some of the 
issues that arose after Windsor, but there is still work to be done. As 
with sports, it "ain't over till the fat lady sings." 194 
193 My preference, to be clear, would be to end joint returns altogether and return to 
single returns for everyone. We would still have to figure out special rules for inter-
spousal transactions, and how a couple's income and expenses should be allocated, but 
single filing would get rid of many of the current problems in a system that creates 
unwarranted marriage penalties. But that's another project, beyond this paper. 
194 This saying is attributed to a San Antonio sports broadcaster in the 1970s, Dan 
Cook. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PROVERllS (5th ed. 2008). 

